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LABOR LAW
Breaching the union constitution:




International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers,
Local Union No. 71
(Docket No. 90-967)
Argument Date: Oct. 16, 1991
ISSUE
The petitioner contends that his local union discrimi-
nated against him by refusing to refer him to jobs, and that
such refusal violated the union's own constitution and by-
laws. The Supreme Court will decide whether Section 301
of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA) creates a
federal cause of action under which a union member can
sue his union for breach of the union's constitution.
FACTS
Petitioner, Guy Wooddell, Jr., is a member of the Inter-
national Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union
No. 71 ("local union"). As a member of the local union,
he opposed several decisions made by the local's president,
R.C. Wooddell, who also happened to be petitioner's older
brother. Specifically, Guy Wooddell opposed an increase
in local union dues and criticized the president's appoint-
ment of his son-in-law as business manager of the local
union, as well as the appointment of several other union
officers.
The local union operates an exclusive hiring hall, which
is the only source for job referrals for both union mem-
bers and non-members with certain electrical contractors
in the Cleveland area. The operation of the hiring hall is
governed by the provisions of a collective bargaining agree-
ment between the local union and various contractors. The
agreement provides that job referrals are made on a first-
in, first-out basis, with all applicants being classified into
four subgroups based on years of experience in the trade
and several other objective factors. All applicants from
Group I are referred to jobs before any applicant from
Group II can be referred, and all applicants from Group
II are referred before going to Group III, etc.
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Guy Wooddell alleged that as a result of his criticism of
the local union president he was discriminated against in
the operation of the hiring hall. Initially, he claimed that
the local union violated the first-in, first-out rule by not
referring him to jobs when his name came up on the list.
Subsequently, he claimed that the union improperly
moved his name from Group I to Group II. As a result of
these discriminatory acts, petitioner claims he suffered eco-
nomic loss by being passed over for jobs to which he
should have been referred.
In response, petitioner asserted a variety of legal claims,
only one of which is pertinent to the appeal pending be-
fore the Supreme Court. He alleged that the actions of the
local union breached both the constitution of the Inter-
national Union, which requires that the union abide by
the terms of its collective bargaining agreements, and the
by-laws of the local union, which require the union to de-
vise a practical and fair means of distributing jobs. Peti-
tioner alleges that by discriminating against him in the
operation of the hiring hall, the local union failed to abide
by the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement
and distributed jobs in an unfair manner.
In an unreported opinion, the district court dismissed
petitioner's federal statutory cause of action based on Sec-
tion 301 of the LMRA for breach of the union constitu-
tion, holding that Section 301 does not give the federal
court jurisdiction to hear cases involving disputes between
individual union members and unions based on the union
constitution.
On June 27, 1990, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals up-
held the district court's dismissal of petitioner's claims in
an unpublished opinion. The U.S. Supreme Court granted
petitioner's request for a writ of certiorari.
BACKGROUND AND SIGNIFICANCE
The issue raised in this case mainly concerns which sub-
stantive law, state or federal, will govern a union member's
cause of action when he alleges that his union has
breached a provision of the union constitution. It is not
seriously contended by either of the parties that a union
constitution does not constitute a contract that governs
the relationship between the union and its members. Nor
does either party argue that the obligations contained in
this contract are not enforceable. Rather, the disagreement
between the parties concerns whether state or federal law
governs the interpretation and enforcement of the obliga-
tions contained in the union constitution.
Issue No. 2
The implications of the choice between state or federal
law are three-fold. If these issues are governed by state law,
then it is possible that the obligations contained in the con-
stitution may be interpreted differently in different states.
The same provision in an international or national consti-
tution, which would apply to members located through-
out the United States, could be interpreted by Missouri
courts as granting protection to union members in Mis-
souri but might be interpreted by Ohio courts as not limit-
ing a union's power vis-a-vis its members in Ohio. If federal
law were to be applied, however, it would increase the
probability of a uniform interpretation of constitutional
provisions throughout the United States.
Secondly, if state law governs the resolution -of claims
for breach of the union constitution, some types of claims
may be held to be preempted by federal law To the ex-
tent that a union member's breach-of-constitution claim
required the consideration of the terms of a collective bar-
gaining agreement, it might be preempted by Section 301;
to the extent the member's claim implicated union con-
duct that is actually or arguably protected or prohibited
by the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), it might be
preempted by the NLRA. If, on the other hand, federal law
governed members' suits under the union constitution,
there would be no preemption problem. As a general rule,
federal law may preempt state law attempts to regulate the
same issues as federal law; it does not preempt other fed-
eral law.
Lastly, if federal law were held to be applicable to these
types of disputes, there is the possibility of opening the
floodgates to a new flow of lawsuits onto an already over-
burdened federal court system.
ARGUMENTS
For Guy Wooddell, Jr. (Counsel of Record, Theodore E.
Meckler; Meckler & Meckler Co., L.PA., STE 1350, 614 NW
Superior Avenue, Cleveland, OH 44113; telephone (216)
241-5151):
1. The union constitution is a contract, and violations of
the constitution can be addressed by a suit for breach
of contract. The Supreme Court has implicitly recog-
nized this proposition in previous cases.
2. In Plumbers v. Plumbers Local 334, 452 U.S. 615 (1981),
the Supreme Court held that a union constitution is a
"contract between labor organizations" within the
meaning of Section 301, and that federal law governed
when a local union sued its parent union to enforce
the union constitution. The constitution is as much a
contract when the member sues to enforce its provi-
sions as when the local union sues. The word "be-
tween" as used in Section 301 refers to the parties to
the contract; it does not limit the parties to the suit.
3. The Supreme Court has held that union members can
enforce contract rights under other types of Section
301 contracts. In Smith v. Evening News Ass'n, 371 U.S.
195 (1962), the Court held that an individual could sue
under Section 301 to enforce the provisions of a col-
lective bargaining agreement that governed his in-
dividual terms and conditions of employment, and
rejected the contention that only unions had standing
to enforce the contract.
4. Practical problems would be created if federal law did
not govern the individual member's suit to enforce the
union constitution. It is clear that the Plumbers case
requires federal law to be applied in interpreting and
enforcing union constitutions when the union itself is
the plaintiff. If enforcement of the union constitution
by an individual union member were governed by state
law, then the interpretation and enforcement of the
same provision of a constitution could vary from state
to state, depending on where the union member lived.
Moreover, a holding that state law governs when in-
dividual members are plaintiffs, whereas federal law
governs when a union is plaintiff, will result in the ap-
plicability of substantive law being dependent on the
identity of the plaintiff, leading parties to manipulate
the choice of plaintiff in order to shop for the more
favorable substantive law interpretation.
5. Questions of union constitutional interpretation are fre-
quently intertwined with enforcement of federal labor
law, particularly the Labor Management Reporting and
Disclosure Act (LMRDA). For example, certain rights
given to union members under the LMRDA are subject
to reasonable rules in the union constitution. If the in-
terpretation of the constitution were determined un-
der state law, the scope of the federal rights granted to
members of the same union could vary from state to
state, depending on how each state court interprets the
rules contained in the constitution.
6. The interests of uniformity in the application and in-
terpretation of questions of labor law for the purpose
of promoting stability in labor relations call for the ap-
plication of federal law to these cases.
For the International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, Local Union No. 71 (Counsel of Record,
Frederick G. Cloppert, Jr.; Cloppert, Portman, Sauter,
Latanick & Foley, 225 East Broad Street, Columbus, OH
43215; telephone (614) 461-4455):
1. The plain language of Section 301 does not provide for
enforcement of union constitutions by union members.
The statute states that "suits for violation of contracts
... between any such labor organizations may be
brought .... " Thus, the statute explicitly provides for
a union to bring suit for violation of the contract but
not an individual member.
2. Congress' intent in enacting Section 301 was to pro-
vide for the enforceability of collective bargaining
agreements, which were previously difficult if not im-
possible to enforce. The prevailing view with regard
to union constitutions, however, was that they, unlike
collective bargaining agreements, were enforceable in
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state court.
3. While the Supreme Court held in Plumbers that a union
constitution is a contract between labor organizations
governed under Section 301 by federal law, the Court
did not decide that an individual union member could
bring suit under Section 301. A union constitution gives
rise to three types of implied contracts: a contract
among the members themselves, a contract between
the members and the local union, and a contract be-
tween the local union and the national. Members are
not considered third-party beneficiaries of the contract
between the local and the national, which is the "con-
tract between labor organizations" envisaged by Sec-
tion 301. Thus, members do not have standing to
enforce that contract under Section 301.
4. In Plumbers, the Court held that enforcing contract ob-
ligations between parent and subordinate unions could
have been found by Congress to contribute to achiev-
ing industrial stability and thus become the basis for
conferring jurisdiction over such disputes to federal
courts. But disputes over contract obligations between
individual union members and their unions cannot be
said to have the same impact over industrial stability
warranting the assertion of federal jurisdiction.
5. Federal courts are not the appropriate forum for every
dispute between a union member and his union under
the union constitution. Many internal union disputes
have no impact on collective bargaining relationships
or federal labor law. A long line of precedent supports
the application of state law to claims by individual
union members based upon their union constitutions.
AMICUS BRIEFS
In Support of Guy Wooddell, Jr.
The Association for Union Democracy and the Ameri-
can Civil Liberties Union (Counsel of Record, Steven R.
Shapiro, American Civil Liberties Union Foundation, 132
West 43rd Street, New York, NY telephone (212)
944-9800).
Issue No. 2 61
